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APP'ELLANTS' REP'L Y BRIEF 
RESPONDENTS' STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Re::;pondents state that the,y do not agree with ap-
pellants' ::;tatement of facts. Significantly, they do not 
controvert appellants' statement. They merely make their 
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own statement of facts which consists entirely of a digest 
of parts of the testimony of witnesses, a restatement of 
the findings of fact and conclusions of law and some ex-
aggerated comments and erroneous conclusions of re-
spondents' counsel, in all covering sixteen printed pages. 
Since appellants' statement is not controverted either 
expressly or by pointing out wherein it is inconsistent 
with the facts, nothing remains except for the Court to 
determine the law applicable to these facts. 
RESPONDENTS' POINTS OF LAW 
Respondents have combined three distinct proposi-
tions into one conglomerate, making it extremely diffi-
cult to understand their argument. They do not, however, 
contest the fact that the contract of sale covered sub-
stantially all of the corporate assets and that the enforce-
ment thereof would, in effect, put an end to the life of 
the coq)oration. 
A faint attempt is made to uphold the sale upon the 
ground that it was made in the usual course of business. 
This attempt is predicated upon a provision in the Ar-
ticles of Incorporation empowering the company to buy 
and sell real estate. This argument fails to distinguish 
between the powers and the business of the corporation. 
The statute (Section 16-10-4) confers upon all corpora-
tions for profit the power to buy and sell real estate, and 
a provision in the Articles conferring such power is 
superfluous. The business of Arthur N. Grover Farms, 
Inc. and the pnrvose for which it was organized "Was to 
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01wrate the farm lands involved m this action. The 
u::-;ual course of its business was farming and the sale 
of these farm lands would completely frustrate the 
business of the corporation. 
The admitted fact that the contract covered sub-
stantially all assets of the corporation and the undis-
1mkd fact that the sale ·was not made in the usual course 
of business of the corporation brings this case squarely 
under the operation of Section 16-10-74, U.C.A. 1953, 
1\'l1ich is in substance a codification of common law. 
Respondents cannot cope with the finding of the 
trial court that none of the provisions of this section 
wvrc complied with. Since this finding pulls the rug out 
from under respondents' feet, they are compelled to rest 
their case upon the fiction that the corporation and Mr. 
and Mrs. Grover are a single, legal entity. The contention 
seems to be that some sort of estoppel arises out of this 
fiction. 
To characterize the individuals and the corporation 
as a single entity is a perversion of the undisputed facts. 
Arthur N. Grover Farms, Inc. is a valid corporation or-
ganized and existing under the laws of the State of Utah. 
Its corporate powers are vested in a board of directors. 
I ts officers and directors are duly qualified to act as 
:-;1,ch. It is the absolute owner of both legal and equitable 
title to the farm lands in question. It has been since its 
organization, actively engaged in operating this farm. 
Contrary to respondents' unsupported assertions to the 
eontrary the shareholders of the corporation are Mr. and 
j[ rs. Grover and their children. 
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The contract of sale purports to be the contract of 
the corporation executed by the vice president. It is not 
the contract of Mr. or Mrs. Grover either in form or 
reality. 
Respondents do not contend that Arthur N. Grover 
Farms, Inc. is not a valid and subsisting Utah corporation 
or that it did not hold both legal and equitable title to 
the property or that it had not, since its organization 
actively managed, controlled and operated this very sub-
stantial farm project. Neither do they deny that the cor-
poration is the seller of the property and executed the 
contract of sale. The contention appears to be that the 
corporation is "a family corporation" and therefore not 
governed by the same law that applies to "a public cor-
poration." This rather startling proposition is not sup-
ported by any authority and it manifestly is without any 
foundation. 
In our opening brief we demonstrated, by the de-
cisions of several courts including our own Supreme 
Court that the corporate veil cannot be pierced in orde,r 
to giye vitality to a totally unauthorized corporate con-
tract of sale, and that the only justification for ignoring 
the corporate entity is to prevent the perpetration of a 
fraud. The cases cited by respondents recognize this 
limited application of the doctrine and are in accord ·with 
the Utah law. 
In the present case the only fraud to be circumvented 
is the constructive fraud of the respondents in taking an 
undue ad\'antage of an aged and infirm couple hy strip-
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ping them of their lifetime accumulations for an uncon-
scionable consideration. We pointed out in our opening 
brief that if the contract of sale is upheld, the respondents 
will be able to acquire this large farming project without 
the investment of any of their own funds, and that the 
tax impaet upon the transaction is disastrous. 
There is not a scintilla of evidence to support re-
spondents' theory of estoppel. They were fully informed 
with respect to the corporate status of Arthur N. Grover 
Farms, Inc. and its ownership of the property involved. 
They knew who the directors and officers of the corpora-
tion were and that there had been no meeting either of 
directors or shareholders and no approval of the trans-
action except by Arthur N. Grover. They had no prior 
dealings either with the corporation or with the Grovers. 
They were not misled and no misrepresentation whrut~ 
ever was made to them or any of them. The only business 
in which the corporation was engaged was farming and 
the sale of farm products. It had never sold any real 
estate either on its own account or for others. 
Respondents say that Section 16-10-74 is really con-
trolled by Section 16-10-6. This is a misconception of the 
corporation act. 
The two sections cover separate and distinct subject 
matters. The latter deals with corporate powers while 
the former deals ·with the procedure that must be followed 
in order to make a valid sale of all of the assets of the 
eompany. 
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Plaintiffs have not attacked the sale upon the ground 
that it is ultra vires. 1'he issues are whether the sale 
was authorized by the directors and approved by the 
shareholders, and whether the vice president had au-
thority to bind the corporation. 
The cases cited by respondents in which they claim 
that a valid sale of all the assets of the corporation can 
be made without complying ·with any of the requirements 
of Section 16-10-74, are readily distinguishable. Only two 
of them deal with a statute similar to ours. In Lange vs. 
Resen;ation Mining Cornpany, the saJe was authorized 
by the board of trustees and was submitted for approval 
at a special meeting of the stockholders called for that 
purpose. Two thirds of the stock voted to approve the 
sale. Unlike the present situation, the sale did not thwart 
the purposes for which the corporation was organized 
nor did it destroy the corporation itself. The Court said: 
"But in the case before us, the sale does not 
disrupt the corporation, nor is it contrary to the 
purposes for which the corporation was formed. 
On the contrary, the corporation ·will be in as good 
a condition to proceed with the objects it was 
formed to promote after this sale as it was before, 
and the sale will be but fulfilling one of its objects 
and purposes." 
In Painter v.-.:. Bra11ard, etc., 163 NJ~., six of the 
sPven directors authorized the sale at a formal meeting. 
The nweting was not regularly called but it was held and 
tlw sale ·was approYed by the directors as a unit. Furtlwr-
rnore, it did not clis1iose of all of the assets of tlw r<H'-
vora.tion. 
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It is not necessary to distinguish any of the remain-
mg cases cited by respondents in support of their con-
tention that the appellants are estopped to question the 
sale upon the theory that the corporation was the alter-
ego of Mr. and Mrs. Grover. All of these cases recognize 
the proposition that the corporate entity cannot be dis-
regarded except to prevent fraud or wrong doing. Re-
spondents are unable to ref er us to even a scintilla of 
evidence of any fraud or wrong doing on the part of 
either Mr. or Mrs. Grover. If there is any inequitable 
conduct involved in this transaction it is that of respond-
ents in overreaching and taking advantage of a mentally 
disturbed old man who obviously was incapable of com-
prehending the nature or consequences of the transaction. 
It is likewise unnecessary to distinguish any of the 
cases cited by respondents to support their theory that 
the mandate of Section 16-10-74 may not be invoked by 
a1Jpellants because of the stock ownership of Mr. and 
~lrs. Grover who attested and signed the contract. It is 
not trne that they owned all of the stock in the corpora-
tion. At the time the sale was made the children were 
(•quitable mvners of a substantial amount of the stock. 
\Ve vointed out in our opening brief that it was not of 
vontrolling importance "\Yhether the certificates had been 
dPlin'red or not. 
There is no escape from the conclusion that com-
pliance with the statute is a condition precedent to the 
\'alidity of the sale involved in this action. The powers 
ol' a corporation are ypsted solely in the hoard of direct-
ors. All authority to bind the corporation must eminate 
from tlH· hoard. 
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In the case of a sale of all or substantially all of the 
assets of the company the directors must act as a unit. 
'l'lwy cannot legally act separately or consecutively. They 
must hold a meeting so that the advisability or propriety 
of the transaction can be debated and a composite. con-
clusion reached. Furthermore, they must reduce their 
judgment to writing in order that the stockholders will 
have written evidence of the board's action. This a0tion 
of the board must be approved by the stockholders at a 
meeting called for the express purpose of approving or 
rejecting the action of the board. Without a written reso-
lution of the board of directors authorizing the sale, there 
is nothing for the stockholders to either approve or dis-
approve. It is futile to contend that a single director can 
in df0ct terrninah~ the life of a corporation by disposing 
of all of its assets without even consulting the other di-
rectors. 
All of the negotiations leading up to the sale in this 
case were conducted by Arthur N. Grover. He did not 
even execute the contract on behalf of the corporation. 
He merely atksted the execution by the vice-president, 
who acted solely under the undue influence of her hus-
band. 
THE GROVERS ARE NOT 
INDIVIDUALLY LIABLE 
The judgment of the trial court imposing a per-
sonal liability upon the Gro\'ers under the contract for 
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$5,000, attorney's fee and $525, the value of grazing 
rights that the corporation did not own is completely in-
defensible upon any plausible theory. Re,spondents do 
not intimate that the Grovers actually or impliedly rep-
resented or warranted that they had authority to dispose 
of the corporation's assets and put it out of business. 
Respondents were fully informed of the fact that the 
farm lands were mvned by the corporation. They knew 
that the sale was not authorized, by the board of direc-
tors. They knew or had the means of knowing that Mrs. 
Grover had no authority whatever to execute the con-
tract on behalf of the corporation. No information was 
withheld and no misrepresentation was ever made by 
either of the Grovers with respect to any matter pertinent 
to the transaction. 
A mere glance at the document will disclose that it 
is not executed or signed by the Grovers as individuals. 
They were expressly designated as vice president and 
:-H·cretary respectively. 'rhere is not a word in the con-
tract to indicate that either of them is a party to it. To 
hold that the contract is the contract of the individuals 
~n1d the corporation is in the teeth of the uncontrovert-
ahle facts. It is pre11ostrrous to contend that the contract 
mnst lw held to be the contract of Mr. and Mrs. Grover 
in ordt'l' to prevt'nt the pt:>rpetration of a fraud upon the 
respondents. Admittedly a wrong has been done, but the 
\':et;m:o. are the appellants and not the respondPnts. 
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CONCLUSION 
Hesvondenb have not controverted the facts that 
the sale of the farm land to respondents covered sub-
stantially all of the assets of the corporation and that the 
sall' was not made in the usnal course of business. They 
do not question the finding of the trial court that none of 
tlw requirements of Section 16-10-74 U.C.A. 1953 were 
complied with or that either of the Grovers had any ac-
tual authority to bind the coqwration by the contract of 
sale. Their contention that the Grovers and the corpora-
tion must be regarded as a single legal entity in order 
to prevent the perpetration of a fraud upon them is with-
out any merit, and the authorities upon which they rely 
negate rather than support their contentions. Respond-
Pnts liave no answer to our argument that the Grovers 
cannot he held individually liable nnder the contra0t 
upon any theory of breach of warranty. They rest their 
case upon the false proposition that the Grovers and the 
corporation are one and the same legal entity. They have 
failed to furnish an~Y sound support for the judgment of 
th<> trial court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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